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Abstract
This paper shows that skill mismatch is a significant source
of inequality in real earnings in the U.S. and that a substan-
tial fraction of the increase in wage dispersion during the period
1973–2002 was due to the increase in mismatch rates and mis-
match premia. In 2000–2002 surplus and deficit qualifications
taken together accounted for 4.3 and 4.6 percent of the variance
of log earnings, or around 15 percent of the total explained vari-
ance. The dramatic increase in over-education rates and premia
accounts for around 20 and 48 percent of the increase in the Gini
coefficient during the 30 years under analysis for males and fe-
males respectively. The surplus qualification factor is important
in understanding why earnings inequality polarized in the last
decades.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades the U.S. wage structure has widened.
While the general trend has been toward greater inequality of earn-
ings, the evolution of the wage distribution has followed a complex
pattern.1 The literature that was spurred has investigated the degree
to which the rise in income and wage inequality can be attributed to
changes in the returns to skill (eg. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Murphy
and Welch, 1992; Bound and Johnson, 1992)2. There are two good
reasons to focus on skill differentials. First, in decomposition exer-
cises inequality between skill groups accounts for around a third of
the variance of earnings in a cross-section of the working population.
Since no other observable factor comes close in explaining variation in
earnings at a point in time, it is natural to expect that changes in the
wage distribution largely follow changes in the distribution of skills
and their prices.
Second, skill differentials are easily interpreted in the light of a
competitive model of the labor market. If different skill groups are
imperfectly substitutable inputs in production, then shifts in their rel-
ative supply and demand curves can explain changes in their relative
prices. For example, it is widely understood that during much of the
1970s the college premium decreased substantially because the well-
educated baby boom generation entered the labor market increasing
the relative supply of young skilled workers (Freeman, 1976). In the
decade that followed, despite the continuous rise in the relative sup-
ply of skilled workers, there was a very significant increase in the wage
differentials by education and labor market experience. Thus, several
1For example, a well-known exception to increasing earnings inequality is the
shrinking male–female wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2006). The analysis in this paper
is conducted for males and females separately.
2See also the reviews of the literature in Levy and Murnane (1992) and Katz
and Autor (1999). DiNardo et al. (1995) and Lee (1999) made the case that
other important forces —changes in labor market institutions in particular— are
fundamental in understanding the changes in the wage structure since the 1970s.
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studies concluded that during the 1980s there was a strong shift in
the relative demand for high-skill workers. Skilled biased technologi-
cal change [SBTC] —the computer revolution in particular— was the
leading candidate cause for the relative demand shifts.3
Despite the justified focus on skill wage differentials, it is a fact
that residual or within-group wage inequality —i.e wage dispersion
among workers with the same education and experience— accounts
for the majority of the increase in the variance of earnings.4 One pos-
sible explanation for the increase in residual inequality involves unob-
servable differences in human capital. If individuals differ in innate
ability levels, schooling quality, motivation, etc., then an increase in
either the dispersion of the unobservable abilities or the rewards that
accrue to them could account for the rise of inequality within groups.5
Another possibility is that within-group inequality is due to individu-
als’ “behavioral traits” which are not productive skills (Bowles et al.,
2001). Because the groups that happen to have greater within disper-
sion —highly educated and more experienced— have become more
prevalent over time, the increase in residual inequality is partly a me-
chanical outcome of these compositional changes (Lemieux, 2006a).
In this paper, I explore an alternative story that relies on the dis-
persion of outcomes within education groups because of the existence
of skill mismatch. According to assignment models of the labor mar-
ket, not all workers are allocated to jobs in which their skills are re-
quired.6 Some workers will be over-qualified, meaning that the skills
3Among others, this point was raised by Bound and Johnson (1992); Juhn et al.
(1993) and Acemoglu (2002). A critical view is articulated in Card and DiNardo
(2002).
4According to Katz and Autor (1999, p. 1490), 60% of the increase in the
variance of log weekly wages over the 1963–1995 period was due to the growth of
residual inequality.
5For example, using the assumption that all residual inequality is due to unob-
served skill differences, Juhn et al. (1993, p. 429) find that about two-thirds of the
increase in the 90–10 percentile gap of log wages over the period 1964–88 is due to
changes in unmeasured prices and quantities.
6Assignment models are reviewed in Sattinger (1993). The task-based model in
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they possess are above those required on the job. Similarly, some
workers might have less qualifications than those required. Normally,
over(under)-educated workers will have lower(higher) earnings than
correctly matched workers with the same levels of skill. An increase
in these match differentials or in the prevalence of mismatch has the
potential to explain the increase in residual dispersion that accounts
for the majority of the growth in earnings inequality. While there are
many studies that look at match differentials,7 to my knowledge this
is the first paper explicitly linking the growth in earnings inequality
to over- and under-qualifications.
The idea that skill mismatch might contribute to explain the changes
in the wage structure is consistent with the nuanced version of the
SBTC hypothesis as developed in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)
[ALM] and Goos and Manning (2007). According to ALM, technolog-
ical change generally works toward substituting routine cognitive and
manual tasks but is complimentary to non-routine tasks. Routine
tasks are prevalent in “middling jobs”, i.e. jobs that require aver-
age or just above-average skills and have traditionally paid around
median wages. The ALM hypothesis predicts technological change
reduces relative demand for these jobs and increases relative demand
for jobs intensive in non-routing tasks. On the one hand, the require-
ment of non-routine skills is what distinguishes the best jobs in the
market: managerial and professional positions. On the other hand,
the worst paid jobs in the economy –eg. cleaning– are also heavy
in non-routine tasks that cannot be substituted by technology. All
in all, ALM provide a compelling argument that technology leads to
increasing relative demand at these two extremes of the job distribu-
tion and decreasing demand for middling jobs. If this process of job
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) also has the property that skill groups can be assigned
to a range of tasks of varying complexities. A skill mismatch equilibrium is also
present in the search model in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and the efficiency wage
model in Skott (2006).
7I present a brief review of this literature in section two. For a comprehensive
survey see McGuinness (2006).
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polarization is accompanied by a continuous increase in the educa-
tional qualifications of the labor force, then it is to be expected that
more and more highly educated individuals will end up in positions
for which they are over-qualified. In this paper I attempt to determine
to what extent this story is supported by the data.
Following the modern literature on skill mismatch, I start by spec-
ifying an extended earnings function that decomposes education into
three parts: required, surplus and deficit qualifications. Using the
Shapley value decomposition method developed in Shorrocks (1999),
I then show that considering skill mismatch factors significantly in-
creases the fraction of earnings inequality that can be explained at
any point in time. I analyze not only the variance of earnings but also
the Gini coefficient, and the 90–10, 90–50 and 50–10 percentile gaps.
While the added explanatory power of the extended equation is
modest, the decomposition of the changes in the inequality indexes
shows that surplus qualifications have had a surprisingly important
role in explaining the changes in wage distribution over the period
1973–2002. For example, 20 and 48 percent of the changes in the Gini
coefficient of log earnings for males and females respectively can be
explained by increases in the surplus qualifications factor alone (see
table 3 in section 4). I also find evidence that the same factor accounts
for a very significant fraction of the increase in inequality in the upper
half of the distribution and has been an important determinant of why
inequality did not increase as much in the lower half. This is what
would be expected if over-education played the role implied by ALM
and Goos and Manning.
In the next section the methodology is explained in detail. In
section three I discuss the measurement of skill requirements and the
processing of the Current Population Survey (CPS) earnings data.
I also provide a descriptive analysis of the major trends in earnings
inequality and skill mismatch. Section four presents and discusses the
results. The concluding section summarizes the findings.
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2 Methods
In this section I briefly explain the methods applied in the paper.
First, I provide some details on the extended earnings function and the
definition of the mismatch variables. I then explain how the estimated
earnings function is used to decompose income inequality into factor
components and the decomposition of inequality indexes based on the
Shapley value.
2.1 Extended Earnings Function
Starting with Duncan and Hoffman (1981), the empirical literature on
skill mismatch has been centered around the estimation of an equation
of the form:
Yi,t = Xi,t · γt +
[
Qri,t Q
s
i,t Q
d
i,t
] ·
 βrtβst
βdt
+ εi,t (1)
Ei,t ≡ Qri,t +Qsi,t −Qdi,t
where i and t index individuals and time respectively. Yi,t represents
log earnings, Xi,t is a vector of personal characteristics (including
a constant and some function of age or experience), Qi,t represents
qualifications and εi,t is the error term. The vectors of parameters
to be estimated are γt and βt. The novelty of the approach involves
splitting the education variable (Ei,t) into three parts: required (r),
surplus (s), and deficit (d) qualifications.8 The standard Mincerian
approach corresponds to the particular case where βrt = β
s
t = −βdt , so
8All on-the-job training is assumed to be required so no decomposition applies
in this case. A similar model has been estimated (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989)
that uses attained education and indicator variables for over- and under-educated
workers in the right-hand-side instead of the required, deficit and surplus schooling
variables. The latter model has been criticized because the returns to surplus and
deficit schooling cannot be clearly identified (Cohn, 1992).
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that required, surplus, and deficit qualifications all receive the same
return.9
Given data on the individual’s education attainment and the edu-
cation required on the job, the surplus and deficit qualifications vari-
ables are defined as follows:
Qsi,t ≡ 1
(
Ei,t −Qri,t > l
) · (Ei,t −Qri,t)
Qdi,t ≡ 1
(
Qri,t − Ei,t > l
) · (Qri,t − Ei,t)
where 1(·) is the indicator function. Ei,t and all qualification variables
are measured in years of formal schooling. Only individuals whose
education deviates at least l years from the qualifications actually
required on the job are classified as mismatched. The choice of l is
largely arbitrary, which means the levels of the resulting mismatch
rates are relatively uninformative.10 I set l = 1 but the main results
are robust to different choices for this parameter within a reasonable
range. Note that correctly matched individuals will have Qr in the
range [Ei,t − l, Ei,t + l] and Qs = Qd = 0.
There are several extensive surveys of studies that estimate equa-
tion (1) (Green et al., 1999; Hartog, 2000; Sloane, 2003; McGuinness,
2006). As a general rule, all studies tend to confirm Sicherman’s (1991)
stylized facts11 relating to the earnings of over- and under-educated
workers:
9The other particular case of note corresponds to Thurow’s (1975) job compe-
tition model, where βst = β
d
t = 0.
10This is not unlike the choice of the number of weeks within which an individual
must have searched for a job to be considered unemployed. There is considerable
variation in the existing estimates of the incidence of skill mismatch for the U.S.
and other countries. Depending on the measure utilized, the country, the period,
and data source, studies have found rates of over-education ranging from 10 to
42%, with an “un-weighted” average of 23.3% in the 25 studies summarized by
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000). Their average for under-education is
14.4%. The standard deviations are quite high: 9.9 and 8.2 percentage points
respectively.
11Rubb (2003) provides a consistent meta-analysis of 85 estimates of the β pa-
rameters. The return to required education is 9.6% on average. Each year of
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1. The earnings of over-educated workers are less than the earnings
of those who have the same level of education but are in jobs
where those qualifications are required (e.g. a college graduate
working at a grocery store earns less on average than a college
graduate who is an investment banker).
2. Over-educated workers’ earnings are however generally above
the earnings of workers in their same occupation or job type,
who are perfectly matched qualifications-wise (i.e., the college
graduate in the grocery store tends to earn more than a high-
school graduate occupying a similar position).
3. The earnings of under-educated workers are more than the earn-
ings of those with the same level of education but who are per-
fectly matched (e.g. a high-school graduate who becomes a man-
ager generally earns more than the average high-school gradu-
ate).
4. The co-workers of under-educated workers who have the appro-
priate formal training tend to earn more than them.
A possible problem with these findings arises because of unob-
servable heterogeneity in individual ability. If over-educated individ-
uals consisted of below-average ability workers then it would not be
surprising to find that the returns to formal education are lower for
them. While these individuals would appear to be mismatched, in
reality they simply have less human capital than higher ability indi-
viduals with the same level of schooling. The converse would hold
for those putatively under-educated. The hypothesis that substantial
individual heterogeneity is responsible for the lower returns to surplus
qualifications can be empirically tested by using panel data. Under
the identifying assumption that individual ability does not vary over
time, fixed effects estimates of the β parameters should effectively deal
surplus schooling yields 5.2%. Finally, deficit qualifications take away 4.8% from
the required education returns.
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with the problem of worker heterogeneity. Using this methodology
and data from the Swedish Level of Living surveys from 1974, 1981,
1991, and 2000, Korpi and T˚ahlin (2009) find that the null hypothesis
of equal returns to surplus, deficit and required qualifications can be
safely rejected. This study suggest that mismatch is a real issue and
not just an artifice of unobservable individual heterogeneity.12
2.2 Decomposing Earnings Inequality
In this paper, I apply a regression-based method to decompose differ-
ent inequality measures into their factor components. As a first step,
I use the estimation results from equation (1) to divide log earnings
into additive income components. Specifically, there are J compo-
nents corresponding to the explanatory variables of the regression,
one component for the constant, and one final component due to the
regression residuals. Formally, let a and Z be defined as follows:
a′t ≡
[
γˆ′t βˆrt βˆst βˆdt 1
]
Zt ≡
[
Xt Q
r
t Q
s
t Q
d
t eˆt
]
where γˆ and βˆ are OLS estimates and eˆ are residuals from equation (1).
Omitting the time subscript, the income component corresponding to
the jth factor is Yj = ajzj , with Y =
∑J+2
j=1 Yj .
In the second step, I apply the Shapley value decomposition rule13
to obtain each factor’s contribution to earnings inequality. I study the
following inequality measures: the variance, the Gini coefficient, and
the 90–10, 90–50 and 50–10 percentile gaps.
12Other studies that estimate equation (1) using fixed effects are Bauer (2002)
and Tsai (2010). Unfortunately their databases only allow voluntary transitions in
and out of mismatch, which makes their results less reliable.
13The Shapley value decomposition is developed in Shorrocks (1999) and Sastre
and Trannoy (2002). See also Israeli (2007) and Devicienti (2010).
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It is easier to understand the Shapley value decomposition by first
going through other simpler decomposition rules. Let Υ = {1, 2, . . . , J + 2}
be the set of factor indexes. For the inequality measure I(·) define the
function:
F: {S | S ⊆ Υ} → R
/
F(S) = I
∑
i∈S
Yi +
∑
i∈Υ\S
Y¯ie

where Y¯i is mean income from factor i and e is a vector of ones. The
function F(S) gives income inequality after income from all factors not
in subset S has been equalized. Clearly, F(∅) = 0 and F(Υ) = I(Y ).
A desirable property of any decomposition rule is that the result-
ing contributions of the factors can be interpreted in an intuitively
appealing way. A natural candidate is a rule that equates the contri-
bution of each factor to its first-round marginal impact:
Mj(Υ) = F(Υ)− F(Υ\{j}), j ∈ Υ
As explained in Shorrocks (1999), this decomposition rule is sym-
metric (or anonymous) in the sense that the contribution assigned
to each factor does not depend on the way the factors are listed
or labeled. However, the rule is in general not additively exact, i.e.∑
j∈Υ Mj(Υ) 6= I(Y ).
A related decomposition rule considers the marginal impact of each
factor in an elimination sequence. Let σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σJ+2) indicate
the order in which the factors are removed and let S(σr, σ) = {σi |
i ≥ r} be the set of factors that remain before factor σr is to be
eliminated. Then the marginal impacts are given by
Cσj = Mj [S(j, σ)], j ∈ Υ
This decomposition rule does add up:
10
∑
j∈Υ
Cσj = [F(Υ)− F(Υ\{σ1})] + [F(Υ\{σ1})− F(Υ\{σ1, σ2})] + . . .
. . .+ [F({σJ+1, σJ+2})− F({σJ+2})] + [F({σJ+2})− F(∅)]
= I(Y )− 0 = I(Y )
There is clearly a path-dependency problem with such a rule, how-
ever. The Shapley value decomposition remedies this problem by as-
signing to each factor the average of its marginal impact in every
possible elimination sequence. Let the set Σ contain the (J + 2)! pos-
sible elimination sequences. The Shapley value contribution of factor
j is given by
CShj =
1
(J + 2)!
∑
σ∈Σ
Cσj =
1
(J + 2)!
∑
σ∈Σ
Mj [S(j, σ)] (2)
=
J+2∑
s=1
∑
{j}⊆S⊆Υ
|S|=s
1
(J + 2)!
∑
σ∈Σ
S(j,σ)=S
Mj(S)
=
J+2∑
s=1
∑
{j}⊆S⊆Υ
|S|=s
(J + 2− s)!(s− 1)!
(J + 2)!
Mj(S)
The Shapley decomposition inherits the “adding up” and “anonymity”
properties from the more primitive decomposition rules it is based on.
Because it considers every possible elimination sequence, it is not path-
dependent. Finally and most importantly, the Shapley value has the
intuitive interpretation of giving the expected marginal impact of each
factor when the expectation is taken over all the possible elimination
paths.
It is useful to express the Shapley decomposition in percentage
terms as follows
11
SShj ≡
CShj∑
j∈Υ C
Sh
j
=
CShj
I(Y )
, j ∈ Υ (3)
Because it is an average of marginal effects over all elimination se-
quences, the Shapley decomposition generally depends on the level of
aggregation of the factors. An important exception is the variance.14
In this case, the marginal effect can be written:
MVarj (S) =Var
(∑
i∈S
Yi
)
−Var
 ∑
i∈S\{j}
Yi
 , {j} ⊆ S ⊆ Υ
=Var (Yj) + 2Cov
Yj , ∑
i∈S\{j}
Yi

Note that the set Υ\(S\{j}) has the same multiplier as S in the sum
in equation (2). The marginal effect for this set is
MVarj
[
Υ\(S\{j})] =Var (Yj) + 2Cov
Yj , ∑
i∈Υ\(S\{j})
Yi

It then follows that the Shapley decomposition for the variance is
given by
CSh,Varj =
J+2∑
s=1
∑
{j}⊆S⊆Υ
|S|=s
(J + 2− s)!(s− 1)!
(J + 2)!
1
2
(
MVarj
[
S
]
+ MVarj
[
Υ\(S\{j})])
=
J+2∑
s=1
∑
{j}⊆S⊆Υ
|S|=s
(J + 2− s)!(s− 1)!
(J + 2)!
Var(Yj)+ Cov(Yj , ∑
i∈Υ\{j}
Yi
)
14This applies as well to the square of the coefficient of variation.
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A key point is that the expression in brackets no longer depends
on S. We therefore have
CSh,Varj =Var
(
Yj
)
+ Cov
(
Yj , Y − Yj
)
=Cov
(
Yj , Y
)
, j ∈ Υ (4)
Finally, we have
SSh,Varj =
Cov
(
Yj , Y
)
Var(Y )
, j ∈ Υ (5)
Equation (5) is well known in the literature on inequality decom-
position. It is the decomposition into “factor inequality weights”
suggested in Fields (2003). Shorrocks (1982) showed that this for-
mula –which he calls the “natural” decomposition of the variance–
is the only one satisfying a set of desirable properties for the family
of continuous and symmetric inequality measures that are equal to
zero if and only if income is equally distributed among all individ-
uals. The Fields-Shorrocks decomposition rule adds-up and is also
symmetric/anonymous. In addition, it is independent of the level of
disaggregation. The amount of inequality accounted for by any one
factor does not depend on how the other factors are grouped. Finally,
it is easy to show that the J inequality weights corresponding to the
regressors will add up to the R2 of the regression.15
A major drawback of the Fields-Shorrocks decomposition is that
it does not in general have an intuitive interpretation. A statement
such as “twenty percent of earnings inequality is due to differences in
education levels in the population” is generally interpreted to mean
that if everyone’s attained education were the same, inequality would
be reduced by something close to a fifth of its original level. The
decomposition into factor inequality weights only allows this kind of
interpretation when inequality is measured by the variance or the
15See Shorrocks (1982); Fields (2003) for a complete formal statement of the
properties satisfied by this decomposition rule.
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square of the coefficient of variation. In contrast, the Shapley value
provides an intuitively interpretable decomposition rule that varies
numerically according to the inequality measure under consideration.
In the case of the variance both decomposition rules coincide, and
therefore the Shapley value is in this case also independent of the
level of disaggregation of the factors.
One final point involves the use of Shapley values to decompose
changes in inequality indices over time. The change in inequality
index I(·) can be written
∆I[Y (t)] =I[Y (t+ 1)]− I[Y (t)] =
J+2∑
j=1
[
CSh,Ij,t+1 − CSh,Ij,t
]
The percent contribution of factor j to the change in inequality is
given by:
ΛSh,Ij,t =
CSh,Ij,t+1 − CSh,Ij,t
∆I[Y (t)]
, j ∈ Υ (6)
I refer to the Λj as differential Shapley weights. The decompo-
sition in equation (6) has the same properties as the Shapley value
decomposition for the level of inequality at a point in time.
2.3 The Yun decomposition
When inequality is measured by the variance, Yun (2006) has shown
that it is possible to further decompose the changes in inequality into
a price, a quantity, and a residual effect.16
Let the counterfactual wage distribution that would have prevailed
in year t+ 1 if prices had been those of year t be defined as
YC ≡ Zt+1 · at
16See also Simo´n (2010) for an application of this method.
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Let CSh,Varj,C be the Shapley contribution to the variance of factor
j under the counterfactual distribution of income. The change in the
variance can be decomposed as follows
∆Var[Y (t)] =
(
Var[Y (t+ 1)]−Var[YC ]
)
+
(
Var[YC ]−Var[Y (t)]
)
=
J+2∑
j=1
[
CSh,Varj,t+1 − CSh,Varj,C
]
+
J+2∑
j=1
[
CSh,Varj,C − CSh,Varj,t
]
Noting that CSh,VarJ+2,t+1 = C
Sh,Var
J+2,C = Var(eˆt+1) we get
∆Var[Y (t)] =
J+1∑
j=1
[
CSh,Varj,t+1 − CSh,Varj,C
]
+
J+1∑
j=1
[
CSh,Varj,C − CSh,Varj,t
]
+
[
Var(eˆt+1)−Var(eˆt)
]
(7)
where the first, second and third terms on the right-hand-side repre-
sent, respectively, the price, characteristics and residual effects.
3 Measurement issues
In this section, I describe how the qualifications variables are con-
structed and briefly describe the data sources utilized. I also present
a descriptive analysis of the prevalence of over- and under-education.
3.1 Skill Requirements Measure
There is consensus regarding the difficulty of measuring skill require-
ments. Researchers have used three main approaches, all of which have
advantages and drawbacks.17 In the present study skill requirements
are measured using the job-analysis method. This measure relies on
17A discussion of the three methods and their comparative advantages and dis-
advantages can be found in Green et al. (1999) and Chevalier (2003).
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systematic evaluation by professional job analysts who specify the re-
quired level of skills for the job titles in an occupational classification.
In the United States this information is available in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT, U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, 1991).
The DOT has clear definitions and detailed measurement instructions
that all analysts are supposed to follow. Information for each of the
more than 12,000 job titles is gathered through visits by Department
of Labor examiners to at least two establishments in separate regions
of the U.S. that employ workers in that category. They gather infor-
mation on 44 different objective and subjective dimensions, including
training times, required cognitive, interactive and motor skills and
essential worker aptitudes, temperaments, and interests.
The most often used measures of required qualifications are called
“General Educational Development” (GED).18 On a scale of one to
six, the three GED indexes measure mathematical, language and rea-
soning skills for each job title. Howell and Wolff (1991) analyzed the
trends in the GED indexes and other DOT measures of required qual-
ifications (1977 edition) and found that GED is highly correlated with
specific vocational preparation (training time requirements), data (syn-
thesizing, coordinating, analyzing), and three required worker apti-
tudes (intelligence, verbal and numerical). The GED was also corre-
lated with a measure of interactive skills and very weakly correlated
to the motor skill requirements.
Unfortunately, the DOT data collection effort is expensive, so the
data is available at very low frequencies. The fourth edition of 1977
and revised fourth edition of 1991 are the last two data points.19 Later
editions of the DOT do not completely renovate the data. Rather,
new editions focus on the job titles which according to the criteria of
the Department of Labor experts were more likely to have undergone
18For example, ALM use the GED-math index as a measure of non-routine
cognitive skills requirement.
19The Department of Labor has officially discontinued the DOT and replaced it
with a new, incompatible, system called O*NET (Peterson et al., 2001, see).
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significant changes.20
Because the DOT job title coding is not generally available in the
CPS earnings files, it is necessary to aggregate the GED measure to
the census 3-digit occupation level. ALM used an April 1971 CPS
monthly file issued by the National Academy of Sciences in which ex-
perts assigned job title codes to each of 60,441 workers to calculate
weighted sample means of the skill measures from the the DOT 1977
edition for each of the 411 occupations in the 3-digit 1970 occupa-
tional classification. Independent averages for males and females are
available, so the problem generated by the heterogeneity of jobs and
requirements within occupations is at least partially taken care of.
To obtain averages for the 1980 classification, they applied a similar
procedure to a 1980 census sample prepared for the Committee on Oc-
cupational Classification and Analysis. They also compiled averages
for the 1991 Revised Fourth edition of the DOT.21
I merged the GED scores to the CPS data for the years 1977 and
1991 respectively. The highest of the three GED scores is the binding
requirement, so I drop the other two.22 For years other than 1977
and 1991, I let the within occupation GED scores evolve following
a linear trend.23 A final obstacle involves converting the GED score
into the “years of education” unit of measurement. The GED scores
are designed to be mapped into education levels. The lowest GED
score corresponds to skills obtained in primary school (eg. adding and
subtracting 2-digit numbers). Mid level scores require skills such as
computing discounts that are normally obtained in middle and high-
school. The highest GED level involves complex operations such as
20Spenner (1985) reviews the quality of this type of skill requirement assessment.
21Prof. Autor, Levy and Murnane have generously made these data publicly
available.
22This methodological choice is unlikely to affect any results since the three
scores are highly correlated (all pairwise correlations are above 0.9).
23Most time series variation in GED levels results from the evolution of the
occupational distribution. The findings reported below are qualitatively identical
if I restrict the analysis to changes between 1977 and 1991.
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the analysis of dynamic systems. Using a separate dataset containing
both the DOT measures and self-reported education requirements,
Vaisey (2006) found that the functional form that best maps GED
scores into the education requirements variable is a cubic polynomial.
I follow the same approach.24
3.2 CPS Data
With the exception of the skill requirements measure, the data come
from the NBER extracts of the CPS earnings files. The 1970 and
1980 occupational classifications necessary to merge the DOT data
are available in the CPS files for the period 1973–2002. During 1973–
78 earnings related questions were asked to the full CPS sample only
in May. Starting in 1979, earnings questions have been asked every
month to around a fourth of the sample (the outgoing rotation groups
(ORG) in CPS jargon). Details on the treatment of the CPS data are
discussed in the appendix. Here I only briefly discuss how the May
and ORG earning supplements are processed.
As in most other studies of earnings inequality, the sample is
restricted to employed wage and salary workers. Only individuals
between 16 and 64 years of age with positive potential experience
are kept. In trying to cope with the high non-response rates for the
earnings module, starting in 1979 the BLS has allocated earnings to
non-respondents by means of a hot-deck imputation method. Because
earnings were not allocated to non-respondents during 1973-78, obser-
vations with imputed earnings have to be ignored to keep the series
consistent over the whole period. I also drop observations for 1994
and the first eight months of 1995, a period during which allocation
flags are not available.
The earnings variable we use is constructed to represent real hourly
24Reassuringly, the resulting average years of education required almost always
coincides with the mean years actually possessed by those employed in the occu-
pation.
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earnings including overtime, tips and commissions. A known advan-
tage of the May/ORG CPS earnings data is that it provides a point-
in-time measure of earnings. Hourly earnings are weekly earnings in-
cluding overtime, tips and commissions divided by usual weekly hours,
except in the case when a separate (and higher) hourly rate is pro-
vided. Earnings are deflated using the CPI-U-X1 series. As in most of
the literature on earnings inequality, I multiply the sampling weights
by usual weekly hours so as to make the sample of hourly earnings
representative of the total hours worked in the economy. I also ad-
just topcoded earnings, multiplying them by 1.4. After the 1994 CPS
overhaul respondents with variable hours are allowed to answer that
their “[weekly] hours vary”. I use a method developed by Schmitt
(2003) to allocate weekly hours to these workers.
The educational attainment variable is also of great importance
in this study. In 1992 the education item in the CPS questionnaire
was modified. Previously individuals had been asked for the highest
completed grade of schooling (in years). The new item asks for the
highest degree obtained. In 1998 a new battery of questions was added
that permit determining the highest grade completed in most cases. I
follow the imputation procedure developed by Jaeger (1997, 2003) to
obtain a consistent measure of the highest grade completed over the
whole period.25
Until 1982 the CPS used the industrial and occupational classifi-
cation of the 1970 census. The 1980 census classifications are available
during 1983–2002. Minor changes were introduced in the classifica-
tions in 1991, so we adjust the occupation variable in the years prior
to the change to retain continuity.
25The exception is for individuals with at least some college in the years 1992-7.
Details in the appendix.
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3.3 Earnings Inequality
Wage inequality in the U.S. increased significantly during the three
decades under analysis. As shown in figures 1 and 2, measures of
overall inequality in log earnings like the Gini coefficient, the vari-
ance, and the 90–10 percentile gap increased substantially during the
period.26 The Gini coefficient, for example, increased from 0.144 in
1973 to 0.174 in 2002 for males, and from 0.161 to 0.178 for females.27
This is a very significant change for earnings inequality, which usually
moves slowly. The timing of the change is also interesting. Inequality
remained practically constant –males– or decreased –females– during
the 70s and then had an explosive period of growth during the first
half of the 80s. The increase in inequality then slowed down until the
early 90s. What happened to inequality in the last few years of the
period depend on the measure of choice. These trends in overall earn-
ings inequality are well documented in the literature (see for example
Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor et al., 2008).
A quite different story can be told if one looks at inequality in
the upper and the lower-tiers of the distribution separately. Focusing
first on figure 1, after the calm 70s the 90–50 percentile gap increased
sharply. Rather than slowing down and then stagnating like the Gini,
however, the widening of the right half of the male wage distribution
continued at the same pace into the 90s. In sharp contrast, the 50–
10 gap decreased significantly after 1987. By 2002, inequality in the
left half of the distribution was only slightly higher than in 1973.
Indeed, the wage distribution for males was slightly left-skewed at
the beginning of the period but significantly right-skewed at the end.
Thus, rather than a complete stop to the trend toward increasing
inequality in the 90s, there seems to have been a movement toward a
26Growth rates are calculated as log differences. For the percentile gaps, the
growth rates correspond to the difference between the rates of growth of the cor-
responding percentile wages.
27Other commonly studied inequality indexes, like the Theil or the Atkinson
index, followed a similar pattern.
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Figure 1 – The Evolution of Earnings Inequality: Males
(1973=0)
polarization of earnings (Autor et al., 2008).28 This polarizing pattern
is less clear-cut for women than for men because the 50–10 gap in the
female distribution did not bounce back in the 90s to the same extent.
3.4 Mismatch rates
Figure 3 shows the joint distribution of required qualifications and
education at the beginning and the end of the period.29 It is clear
that workers with higher qualifications tend to be allocated to jobs
with higher requirements. If workers tended to be correctly matched,
28Also see Lemieux (2006b), which provides evidence that over time wages have
become an increasingly convex function of years of schooling.
29To make both years of data comparable, I use a random sub-sample of 2002
workers so that both scatter plots have roughly the same number of dots.
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Figure 2 – The Evolution of Earnings Inequality: Females
(1973=0)
the observations would be aligned along the 45 degree lines. However,
the slopes from the simple OLS regressions of required qualifications
on education are around 0.6.
Both for females and for males it is possible to discern two trends.
First, the labor force has become more educated. Second, a much
higher proportion of workers have fallen below the 45 degree line,
leading to higher over-education rates. The latter point is confirmed
by figure 4, which shows the evolution of mismatch rates during 1973–
2002.30 Over-education rates for males and females follow a remark-
ably similar path, starting in 1973 at around 15% and increasing con-
stantly throughout the period to reach levels of around 35% of the
30Table 5 in the appendix contains descriptive statistics quantifying these and
other trends.
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Figure 3 – Required Qualifications and Education
employed labor force. Under-education, on the contrary, follows a
downward trend.
The rising over-education rate is consistent with previous analysis
of the DOT and other direct measures of skill requirements (Hecker,
1992; Wolff, 2000; Handel, 2000). These studies typically show slowly
rising average requirements but much faster growth in the supply of
high-skill workers. However, the increasing over-education rate comes
at odds with conventional thinking about recent labor market trends,
specially during the 1980s. The consensus view is that relative de-
mand for high-skill workers increased substantially during that decade,
which explains why the college premium increased despite the con-
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Figure 4 – Mismatch Rates 1973–2002
tinuous growth of relative supply. If demand for high-skill workers
outpaced supply, how could over-education increase?
The problem with this apparent puzzle is that in the competitive
model in which it is embedded skill mismatch is not possible at all.
On one hand, in a model in which skill mismatch is a possible equilib-
rium outcome, obtaining a jointly increasing skill premium and over-
education rate is relatively straightforward. For example, Skott (2006)
obtains this result in the context of an efficiency wage model in which
high-skill workers can fill both low- and high-tech jobs but low-skill
workers can only be hired in low-tech positions. A negative, neutral
shock to aggregate activity raises unemployment for all workers. As
high- and low-skill groups compete for low-tech jobs, the relative wage
in these jobs comes under pressure. As a result, there is an increase in
the proportion of low-skill jobs, a rising skill-premium, and increasing
over-education. The extension of this model in Slonimczyk and Skott
(2010) shows that a fall in the real value of the minimum wage can
produce similar results.
On the other hand, if the effect of technology on labor demand is
–as argued by ALM and Goos and Manning– polarizing, then the joint
occurrence of rising average returns to schooling and increasing over-
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education is not puzzling. Simply put, technological change makes
higher education a riskier type of investment.
4 Decomposition Results
Studies that extend the earnings function as in equation (1) typically
find that the returns to required qualifications are much larger than
the returns to surplus schooling and that under-educated workers are
penalized for their insufficient qualifications. The differences in the
returns to surplus, deficit, and required qualifications seem significant
enough to motivate the suspicions that (i) skill mismatch accounts
for a significant fraction of earnings inequality, and (ii) changes in
mismatch rates might have contributed to the observed changes in
the wage distribution. Following Fields (2003), we refer to points (i)
and (ii) as the “levels” and the “differences” questions respectively.
4.1 The Levels Question
The first question can be answered by applying the Shapley value
decomposition to different indices of earnings inequality. As explained
above, a factor’s Shapley value is the average marginal impact of the
factor on the inequality index when all possible elimination sequences
are taken into account. It is a measure of the importance of the
factor in explaining earnings inequality at a point in time. The key
levels question in this paper is: how important are surplus and deficit
qualifications in explaining earnings inequality?
The first step in the methodology involves obtaining income com-
ponents based on OLS estimation of equation (1). The results in this
section are based on a specification in which the matrix of controls
(X) include a full set of age dummies.31 I have experimented with
31The rationale for including dummies rather than a polynomial in age is that
the right functional form appears to have changed over time. A quadratic function
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other reasonable specifications, with no significant change in the re-
sults.32 For comparison purposes, I also estimate the same equations
using the standard human capital specification (with actual qualifi-
cations instead of required, surplus, and deficit qualifications in the
right-hand-side).
Estimation results for selected years can be found in table 6 in the
appendix. The estimates are consistent with the findings of the skill
mismatch literature. The returns to required qualifications are sub-
stantially higher than the returns to schooling in the standard earnings
regression. Surplus qualifications yield positive but low returns, and
deficit qualifications bring a penalty. The restriction βr = βs =−βd
is unequivocally rejected at the 1% level of significance in all cases.33
Both for females and males, the returns to required and surplus qual-
ifications have increased monotonously over time, though growth was
particularly strong in the 1980s.
I use these estimates to generate income components for the dif-
ferent regressors and the residuals.34 In table 1, I present descriptive
statistics for these components.
The sample means for the surplus and deficit qualifications income
components have a straightforward interpretation. Define the premia
associated with having surplus or deficit qualifications as the average
difference between the log wages mismatched workers actually earn
and what they would earn if they only had the qualifications that are
required on their jobs (which are kept constant). Formally:
seems to fit well the beginning half of the series but a quartic in age seems more
appropriate for later years (these changes are analyzed in detail in Lemieux, 2006b)
32Specifically, I experimented with: 1) a specification that allowed for non-
linearities in the qualifications variables; 2) including a number of extra controls:
non-white, married, industry (3 sectors), part-time, and public sector indicators,
and 9 region dummies. These alternative specifications are available upon request
from the author.
33Testing each of the two restrictions separately gave the same result.
34The 48 age dummies are consolidated into a single income component due to
age.
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics for Income Components (Yj) based on the
Extended Earnings Equation
A. All Individuals
Males Females
1973 1983 1992 2002 1973 1983 1992 2002
Age† 0.700 0.652 0.607 0.570 0.399 0.427 0.434 0.396
0.034 0.046 0.041 0.029 0.009 0.015 0.017 0.015
βˆrQr 0.896 1.064 1.406 1.545 1.187 1.332 1.644 1.674
0.022 0.030 0.053 0.067 0.037 0.042 0.065 0.074
βˆdQd -0.041 -0.026 -0.021 -0.019 -0.023 -0.012 -0.010 -0.014
0.008 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003
βˆsQs 0.014 0.022 0.044 0.059 0.020 0.032 0.055 0.077
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.013
eˆ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.171 0.175 0.184 0.202 0.142 0.141 0.160 0.177
B. Mismatched Individuals
pid -0.190 -0.209 -0.235 -0.217 -0.162 -0.142 -0.156 -0.181
pis 0.091 0.088 0.143 0.177 0.127 0.143 0.181 0.221
Notes: In panel A, the component’s mean is in the top row and its variance in
the bottom row. The constant income component is omitted. †The age income
component results from the sum of the 48 age dummies. In panel B, pis and pid are
the component’s mean for overeducated and undereducated individuals respectively.
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pis ≡ 1
K
∑
Qs 6=0
[(
βˆrQr + βˆsQs
)− βˆrQr] = βˆs · −→Qs
pid ≡ 1
H
∑
Qd 6=0
[(
βˆrQr + βˆdQd
)− βˆrQr] = βˆd · ←−Qd
where K and H are the total counts and −→x and←−x represent the aver-
age value of x for over- and under-educated workers respectively. Note
that the mismatch premia are simply the average income component
for surplus and deficit qualifications for overeducated and underedu-
cated individuals respectively.
The mismatch premia depend on the average over- and under-
education depth (
−−→
Qs,d) but not on over- and under-education rates.
While, as already discussed, the latter changed markedly over the
period, the former did not. Over/under-education depth went from
3.2/4.1 years in 1973 to 3.4/4.2 years in 2002 for males. For fe-
males, the corresponding figures were 3/3.6 years at the beginning
and 3.5/3.3 years at the end of the period. As result, the mismatch
premia largely followed the same path as the coefficients βˆs,d in table 6.
For example, during the quick rise in returns to skill in the 1980s, the
over-education premium increased by 5.5 and 3.8 percentage points
for males and females respectively.
The mean surplus and deficit qualifications income components
can be written:
βˆsQs ≡ βˆs 1
N
∑
Qs>0
Qsi = pi
sV
βˆdQd ≡ βˆd 1
N
∑
Qd>0
Qdi = pi
dU
where N is the total number of individuals and V and U are the
over- and under-education rates depicted in figure 4. The income
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components for deficit and surplus qualifications are directly related to
mismatch prevalence and premia. This explains why, for example, the
average worker has increased average receipts of “surplus qualifications
income”. Both over-education rate and premia have been on the rise.
It is also possible to relate features of the distribution of the mis-
match income components to the same primitive elements, but in
general the expressions are not very revealing. For example, it is not
hard to show that the variances can be written as:
Var(βˆsQs) =(βˆs)2
[
V
−−−→(
Qs
)2 − V 2(−→Qs)2]
Var(βˆdQd) =(βˆd)2
[
U
←−−−(
Qd
)2 − U2(←−Qd)2]
In the empirically relevant range, the variances will be positively
related to mismatch rates and depth, and to the returns to surplus
and deficit qualifications. Unsurprisingly, both for females and for
males, table 1 confirms a monotonic increase in the variance of the
surplus qualifications income component and a fall in the variance of
the penalties due to deficit qualifications.
However, it is important to emphasize that the relationship be-
tween a factor’s distribution and its effect on overall income inequality
is a complex one, which crucially depends on how the different com-
ponents are correlated. It is not hard to imagine situations in which
a factor becoming more unequally distributed leads to less overall in-
equality. Similarly, it is often the case that a factor contributes to
inequality as measured by some indices but decreases inequality in
others. The second step in the methodology addresses these issues.
In table 2, I present the Shapley value decomposition for the vari-
ance of log earnings, the Gini coefficient, and the 90–10, 90–50 and
50–10 percentile gaps. Apart from the inequality measure, the re-
sults also vary by gender, time period, and depending on whether the
standard or extended earnings equation is used to decompose income.
There are some striking features in the results:
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Table 2 – Shapley Value Decomposition of Earnings Inequality: 1973–75,
1983–85, 1991–93, and 2000–02
A. VARIANCE
(
S
Sh,Var
j
)
Males Females
1973–75 1983–85 1991–93 2000–02 1973-75 1983–85 1991–93 2000–02
Mismatch Equation
Age 15.3 19.8 16.8 12.4 6.2 9.3 8.7 7.4
Qr 12.0 15.0 20.4 22.6 19.2 21.6 25.7 25.3
Qd 2.5 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.6 0.7 0.9 1.4
Qs 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.9 0.6 1.2 1.7 3.2
eˆ 69.9 62.9 59.5 60.7 72.4 67.2 63.1 62.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 16.7 21.5 18.6 13.6 6.6 10.2 9.7 8.1
E 12.0 13.1 18.2 21.7 17.8 17.8 21.5 25.4
eˆ 71.3 65.4 63.2 64.7 75.6 72.0 68.8 66.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. GINI
(
S
Sh,Gini
j
)
Mismatch Equation
Age 18.4 21.9 19.0 14.6 9.3 11.8 10.9 9.8
Qr 15.9 18.2 22.9 25.3 24.2 25.2 28.2 28.0
Qd 4.5 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.5 1.4 1.9
Qs 1.3 1.9 3.2 4.4 2.2 3.5 4.7 6.6
eˆ 59.8 55.1 52.1 52.8 61.5 58.1 54.8 53.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 21.0 24.7 22.0 16.9 11.1 13.9 13.2 11.7
E 17.0 17.2 21.3 25.0 22.5 22.0 25.1 28.9
eˆ 62.0 58.2 56.6 58.1 66.4 64.1 61.8 59.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
C. 90–10 Percentile Gap
(
S
Sh,90–10
j
)
Mismatch Equation
Age 18.9 22.7 20.7 16.2 9.1 13.4 12.0 11.2
Qr 16.6 18.7 23.7 26.3 27.4 27.3 29.9 29.4
Qd 4.6 3.2 2.0 1.4 3.6 0.4 0.6 0.8
Qs 1.5 1.9 3.0 4.4 2.8 3.5 3.8 6.6
eˆ 58.3 53.5 50.6 51.7 57.2 55.3 53.6 51.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 22.1 25.8 23.8 18.6 11.5 16.4 14.6 12.9
E 18.1 18.3 22.1 25.8 25.3 22.2 24.6 30.7
eˆ 59.8 55.9 54.1 55.6 63.1 61.5 60.8 56.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Shapley values for the constants are omitted. The income component for age is derived
from 48 age dummies in the regressions.
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1. The residual is the single most important explanatory factor
of earnings inequality. While this fact should make us humble
regarding the extent of our knowledge, it is possible to give it
an optimistic interpretation. Of the innumerate factors affecting
how income is distributed in a country as diverse as the United
States, by simply looking at age and education we can account
for a very significant fraction of the variation in earnings.
2. The residual factor is quantitatively less significant when skill
mismatch is considered in the specification of the earnings equa-
tion. A simple un-weighted average of the results in the table,
for example, implies that decomposing education into required,
deficit and surplus qualifications reduces the importance of the
residual factor by 4.3 percentage points.
3. The age factor is more important for males than for females.
In contrast, the education factor is relatively more important in
explaining inequality among women. When looking at mismatch
factors, surplus qualifications are in almost every instance more
important in explaining female wage inequality than male. In
contrast, deficit qualifications tend to be more important for
males.
4. Surplus and deficit qualifications jointly explain around 5% of in-
equality. Behind this average, however, there is substantial vari-
ation. For example, in 2000–2 surplus qualifications explained
−0.7% and −1.5% of the 50–10 percentile gap for males and
females respectively, meaning that this inequality index would
actually increase a little if everyone were equally over-qualified.
In sharp contrast, the Qs Shapley values for the 90–50 percentile
gap were 9.2% and 13.4%.
Despite the fact that only a minority of workers are mismatched
and that “mismatch income” is a relatively minor income component,
skill mismatch factors play a quantitatively significant role in explain-
ing earnings inequality at any point in time. I conclude from these
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Table 2 – Shapley Value Decomposition of Earnings Inequality (cont.):
1973–75, 1983–85, 1991–93, and 2000–02
D. 90–50 Percentile Gap
(
S
Sh,90–50
j
)
Males Females
1973–75 1983–85 1991–93 2000–02 1973–75 1983–85 1991–93 2000–02
Mismatch Equation
Age 10.3 13.6 12.7 7.5 5.5 6.2 5.8 4.8
Qr 20.8 21.2 24.8 26.1 32.8 27.3 28.1 26.4
Qd 1.4 1.5 0.9 0.7 -0.2 0.7 0.4 0.3
Qs 3.8 4.8 7.5 9.2 5.7 7.9 9.5 13.4
eˆ 63.7 59.0 54.2 56.5 56.1 58.0 56.2 55.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 10.8 13.7 11.9 7.4 5.3 6.0 4.9 5.7
E 23.0 27.2 33.4 33.9 30.0 30.3 37.5 38.3
eˆ 66.2 59.1 54.7 58.7 64.7 63.7 57.6 56.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
E. 50–10 Percentile Gap
(
S
Sh,50–10
j
)
Mismatch Equation
Age 26.2 30.4 28.5 25.6 13.3 21.8 19.5 19.0
Qr 13.0 16.6 22.6 26.4 21.1 27.4 32.2 33.0
Qd 7.3 4.6 3.2 2.1 7.9 0.1 0.9 1.5
Qs -0.4 -0.4 -1.3 -0.7 -0.7 -1.5 -3.0 -1.5
eˆ 53.8 48.9 47.1 46.6 58.5 52.2 50.4 48.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 31.7 35.8 35.4 30.8 18.7 28.4 26.4 21.6
E 14.0 10.9 11.0 16.9 19.9 12.7 8.7 21.4
eˆ 54.3 53.2 53.5 52.3 61.4 58.8 64.9 57.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Shapley values for the constants are omitted. The income component for age is derived
from 48 age dummies in the regressions.
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results that considering what kind of jobs individuals do, and not
just their qualifications, pays off in terms of explaining inequality in
earnings.
4.2 The Differences Question
A noteworthy aspect of table 2 is the remarkable changes in the Shap-
ley values that have occurred over time. The importance of the resid-
ual factor has declined, while that of required and surplus qualifica-
tions factors have generally increased. In this section I investigate
whether skill mismatch factors can explain the dramatic changes in
inequality indices over time, as shown in figures 1 and 2.
In table 3, I present a decomposition of the changes in the in-
equality indexes based on equation (6). In the few cases in which
the change in an index was negative, a positive(negative) differential
Shapley weight means that the factor exerted a force towards decreas-
ing(increasing) inequality.35
One noteworthy fact is that on average the residual factor is not
as important in the decomposition of inequality changes as it was
found to be when analyzing the levels question. The education factor
in the standard specification and the required qualifications factor in
the specification with mismatch play the leading role in explaining the
increase in inequality over the 30 year period. Because the importance
of the residual factor is significantly smaller in the latter case, we may
conclude again that the disaggregation of qualifications pays off.
35There are several cases in which the differential Shapley weights exceed 100
percent. These results should be interpreted to mean that the evolution of different
factors exerted contradictory impulses on income inequality. To take an extreme
case, between 1973 and 1983 the female 50–10 percentile gap increased 0.029 log
points. Changes in the age-earnings profile and the age composition of the work
force would by themselves have led to almost double such an increase. Similarly,
the required qualifications factor induced an increase in inequality equal to 119
percent of the actual change. Deficit qualifications and residual income were the
countervailing factors that explain why inequality did not increase more than it
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Table 3 – Decomposition of Changes in Earnings Inequality
A. VARIANCE
(
Λ
Sh,Var
j
)
Males Females
1973
to
1983
1983
to
1992
1992
to
2002
1973
to
2002
1973
to
1983
1983
to
1992
1992
to
2002
1973
to
2002
∆Var 0.0295 0.0372 0.0211 0.0877 0.0108 0.0470 0.0307 0.0885
Mismatch Equation
Age 54.6 -3.5 -53.6 4.0 68.8 6.3 0.5 11.9
Qr 34.9 64.6 54.5 52.2 49.8 47.9 26.2 40.6
Qd -4.9 6.0 2.5 1.5 -19.1 1.0 5.0 0.0
Qs 1.1 7.5 12.4 6.5 7.7 5.5 12.2 8.1
eˆ 14.3 25.4 84.2 35.8 -7.2 39.2 56.0 39.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 58.1 -0.7 -59.7 4.9 78.5 8.0 0.3 13.9
E 17.4 60.4 69.0 48.0 -5.8 40.2 57.0 40.4
eˆ 24.5 40.3 90.7 47.1 27.3 51.8 42.8 45.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. GINI
(
Λ
Sh,Gini
j
)
∆Gini 0.0224 0.0133 -0.0059 0.0298 0.0122 0.0099 -0.0055 0.0167
Mismatch Equation
Age 44.5 -15.5 157.4 -4.4 49.8 -4.8 33.7 22.6
Qr 29.1 89.6 -51.1 71.8 28.4 95.1 28.0 68.2
Qd -8.4 0.9 3.6 -6.6 -20.3 -2.5 -13.8 -11.8
Qs 4.5 23.4 -32.8 20.3 17.2 33.9 -47.0 48.1
eˆ 30.3 1.6 22.9 19.0 24.9 -21.6 99.2 -27.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 48.3 -8.3 180.8 -3.0 57.7 1.5 41.8 29.4
E 14.6 79.6 -86.9 63.5 -1.8 88.0 -98.5 83.2
eˆ 37.1 28.7 6.0 39.5 44.1 10.6 156.8 -12.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
C. 90–10 Percentile Gap
(
Λ
Sh,90–10
j
)
∆90–10 0.1369 0.1218 -0.0251 0.2336 0.1017 0.1144 0.0787 0.2949
Mismatch Equation
Age 57.2 5.4 310.8 2.9 53.1 -3.2 12.4 20.4
Qr 34.2 88.1 -119.0 78.8 16.4 64.1 20.9 36.1
Qd -16.5 -12.8 29.4 -19.5 -33.9 3.1 -1.7 -10.9
Qs 5.2 19.0 -57.2 19.1 11.6 2.9 55.0 19.8
eˆ 19.9 0.4 -64.0 18.8 52.7 33.0 13.4 34.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 51.4 15.8 344.9 1.3 58.8 -13.5 13.3 18.6
E 23.4 59.9 -125.8 58.5 -21.2 60.4 119.0 47.9
eˆ 25.3 24.2 -119.1 40.2 62.4 53.1 -32.4 33.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The constant is omitted. The income component for age is derived from 48 age
dummies in the regressions.
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Table 3 – Decomposition of Changes in Earnings Inequality (cont.)
D. 90–50 Percentile Gap
(
Λ
Sh,90–50
j
)
Males Females
1973
to
1983
1983
to
1992
1992
to
2002
1973
to
2002
1973
to
1983
1983
to
1992
1992
to
2002
1973
to
2002
∆90–50 0.0527 0.1147 0.0427 0.2101 0.0727 0.0827 0.0289 0.1844
Mismatch Equation
Age 49.7 12.8 -108.5 -2.6 3.6 6.2 -9.9 2.6
Qr 13.4 48.9 55.4 41.3 -24.6 38.9 -9.6 6.2
Qd -9.2 -1.5 -0.2 -3.2 6.1 -4.4 -3.8 -0.2
Qs 13.2 28.6 30.2 25.1 18.3 24.8 99.7 34.0
eˆ 32.9 11.2 123.2 39.4 96.6 34.4 23.6 57.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 45.2 3.4 -92.3 -5.6 1.1 -9.4 106.1 12.9
E 66.6 78.0 29.5 65.3 20.4 134.4 -129.7 48.0
eˆ -11.9 18.6 162.8 40.3 78.5 -25.0 123.6 39.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
E. 50–10 Percentile Gap
(
Λ
Sh,50–10
j
)
∆50–10 0.0842 0.0071 -0.0678 0.0235 0.0290 0.0317 0.0498 0.1105
Mismatch Equation
Age 61.9 -113.5 46.9 51.9 177.2 -27.8 25.3 49.9
Qr 47.2 716.6 -9.2 413.3 119.4 129.9 38.6 86.0
Qd -21.1 -194.4 10.8 -165.5 -134.2 22.6 -0.5 -28.9
Qs 0.1 -135.9 -2.2 -34.5 -5.2 -54.1 29.0 -3.8
eˆ 11.8 -172.9 53.8 -165.2 -57.2 29.4 7.5 -3.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Standard Equation
Age 55.2 215.7 69.7 62.2 203.5 -24.4 -40.6 28.1
E -3.7 -229.5 -28.0 -2.3 -125.6 -132.3 263.6 47.8
eˆ 48.5 113.8 58.3 40.0 22.1 256.7 -123.0 24.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The constant is omitted. The income component for age is derived from 48 age
dummies in the regressions.
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In our investigation of the levels question we found that, although
significant, the role of deficit and surplus qualifications in explain-
ing earnings inequality was modest. Also, although toward the end
of the period the surplus qualifications factor appears quantitatively
more important than the deficit qualifications factor, the difference is
not large. The analysis of changes in inequality indexes leads to very
different results. Deficit qualifications are for the most part unim-
portant in understanding these changes. Moreover, in most cases the
distribution of this factor moved in the opposite direction, resulting in
a negative –and sometimes large– differential Shapley weight for the
period 1973–2002.
In sharp contrast, both for males and for females the contribu-
tion of surplus qualifications toward explaining changes in inequality
is very significant. The sheer sizes of the figures for ΛShQs , specially for
women, suggest that the over-education phenomenon is very impor-
tant in understanding the changes in the wage distribution in the last
three decades. For example, the decomposition exercise shows that
over 20 and 48 percent of the increase in the Gini coefficient for males
and females respectively can be attributed to the surplus qualifications
factor.
Looking at the sub-periods, there are several interesting findings.
First, note that the variance, the Gini and the 90–10 gap increased in
the first two sub-periods. Required and surplus qualifications made
positive contributions to these increases. The 1992–2002 sub-period
is clearly different. Inequality either increased at a lower pace or
decreased, mostly because of the compression of age differentials.
This same description fits well the 90–50 percentile gap but not
the 50–10. The most important difference is that in the latter case
surplus qualifications did not contribute to the increase in inequal-
ity of the 80s. On the contrary, according to the decomposition the
increase in over-education rates and premia was one of the main fac-
did.
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tors containing the growth of inequality in the lower half of the wage
distribution.
Overall, the findings in this section suggest the surplus qualifica-
tions factor has played an important role in the changes in the wage
distribution. It is one of the most important factors explaining the
continuous increase in the 90–50 gap and has helped contain inequality
in the 50–10 gap, the main ingredients of the polarization of income
much discussed in the modern literature on earnings inequality.
4.3 The Effect of Prices and Characteristics
The differential Shapley weights provide a summary measure of the
contribution of a factor toward explaining changes in inequality. In
the case of the variance it is possible to further disaggregate into the
price and quantity effects for each factor using equation (7).
The results for Yun’s decomposition are in table 4. As expected,
in every sub-period the contribution of the residual is the same as in
table 3. The price effect is clearly the dominant factor explaining the
rise in the variance of log earnings over the 30 year period, both for
males and for females. In particular, the increase in the returns to
required qualifications alone explains more than half and over a third
of the change in the variance for males and females respectively.
The pattern of price effect dominating the effect of characteristics
is observed in the first two subperiods. However, the results for 1992–
2002 are somewhat different. For males, while the returns to required
qualifications continued to increase there was a sharp contraction in
age earnings differentials. At the same time, the distribution of all
characteristics moved toward increasing the variance. For females,
the effect of characteristics was in the same ballpark as for males,
while the price effect of age and required qualifications was negligible.
The contribution of surplus qualifications to explaining changes
in the variance are less impressive than for the Gini or the 90–10
percentile gap. According to the Yun decomposition, the increase
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in over-education rates was most important in the first sub-period
and then decreased. In contrast, the returns to surplus qualifications
started off exerting a downward pressure on the variance and ended
contributing significantly to its increase.
5 Conclusions
Until a few years ago, a conventional view was that wage inequality in
the U.S. has grown in time led by increases in the relative demand for
high skill workers, probably due to changes in technology that favor
those workers vis-a-vis the less intensively trained. The stabilization
of the college premium and other inequality measures since the early
1990s —while the computer revolution is still progressing— meant
that the SBTC hypothesis had to be revised. The current view is that
computer technology has a complex, non-monotone relationship with
skill requirements. A stylized description is that computers replace
humans in routine tasks and complement humans in non-routine tasks.
Depending on the skill level of the workers performing those tasks
when the new technologies are introduced, they can result in demand
growth that is monotone in skill (like in the 80s) or in a polarizing
pattern (like in the 90s).
An important prediction of the revised SBTC perspective is that
technology has a complex relationship to skill demand. While there is
consensus that employment in highly desirable –“lovely” in Goos and
Manning’s words– jobs like managements and professional positions
has increased, technological change has also resulted in fast-growing
demand for service sector and other “lousy” jobs. In fact, skill re-
quirements have not increased as fast as the early SBTC hypothesis
would suggest. The DOT data presented here and in other stud-
ies shows that average skill requirements in the economy have grown
very slowly during the period that elapsed between the last two edi-
tions (1977–1991). In contrast, during the period studied in the paper
average levels of education attainment grew constantly and at a much
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faster rate than skill requirements.
What this paper adds to the conventional view is the explicit con-
sideration of the possibility of skill mismatch. While more educated
workers tend to do relatively better in the labor market, a substantial
fraction of them end up in jobs whose requirements are below their
acquired levels of skill. The evidence suggests that over-qualification
rates have increased substantially, while under-education has experi-
enced a downward trend. Changes in the depth of skill mismatch,
while significant, have been less impressive.
Surplus qualifications are rewarded in the marketplace to some
extent. Thus, over-educated workers would be worse off had they
acquired only enough education to match requirements on their jobs
(assuming prices remain constant). However, they would be better off
if the mismatch were eliminated through increases in requirements.
The converse is true about under-educated workers. As a consequence,
the contribution of the education factor toward explaining earnings
inequality is more complex than what would appear at first glance.
This paper shows that skill mismatch has been a relevant cause
of inequality in real earnings in the U.S. at any point in time. For
example, surplus and deficit qualifications taken together account for
4.3 and 4.6 percent of the variance of log earnings, around 15 per-
cent of the total explained variance in 2002, for males and females
respectively. Moreover, the disaggregation of qualifications reduces
the importance of the residual factor regardless of the inequality in-
dex under consideration.
The analysis of changes in the wage distribution shows that a sub-
stantial fraction of the increase in overall inequality during the period
1973–2002 was due to the increase in mismatch rates and mismatch
premia. For example, around 20 and 48 percent of the increase in the
Gini coefficients during the 30 years under analysis can be attributed
to the growth in the explanatory power of surplus qualifications, again
for males and females respectively.
Finally, surplus qualifications have been an important driver in the
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constant growth of inequality in the upper half of the wage distribution
and also important in understanding why inequality did not grow as
much in the lower half, specially for males.
A Data Appendix
The main source of data are the NBER extracts of the CPS earnings files for
the period 1973–2002. The CPS sample is a probability sample selected to be
representative of the civilian, non-institutional population of the United States 16
years of age and older. Because of its very large size—currently about 60, 000
households are interviewed each month—the CPS allows for fairly fine-grained
analyses of labor market trends. An adult (the reference person) at each household
is asked to report on the activities of all other persons in the household. Each
household entering the CPS is administered 4 monthly interviews, then ignored
for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4 more months before leaving the sample
permanently. During 1973–78 earnings related questions were asked to the full CPS
sample only in May. Starting in 1979, earnings questions have been asked every
month to households in their fourth and last months of interviews (the outgoing
rotation groups (ORG) in CPS jargon).
Sample Restrictions The study focuses on employed wage and salary work-
ers and excludes the self-employed and those who work without pay. Only individ-
uals between 16 and 64 years of age with positive potential experience are kept.
Potential experience has the usual definition (age − educ − 6). A final exclusion
involves individuals with allocated earnings, who could not be considered because
earnings were not allocated to non-respondents during 1973–78. I also have to drop
observations for 1994 and the first eight months of 1995, a period during which
allocation flags are not available.
Earnings and hours The earnings variable we use is constructed to repre-
sent real hourly earnings including overtime, tips and commissions. A known ad-
vantage of the May/ORG CPS earnings data is that respondents are asked about
their earnings during a reference week earlier in the month. Thus, it approximates
a point-in-time measure of earnings. Our hourly earnings variable is defined as
weekly earnings including overtime, tips and commissions divided by usual weekly
hours, except in the case when a separate (and higher) hourly rate is provided.
Topcoded earnings are multiplied by 1.4, the conventional factor adjustment to
avoid bias in calculating mean earnings. Finally, due to errors at the data entry
stage a small proportion of individuals have irregularly small or large weekly hours,
resulting in correspondingly high or low hourly earnings. Earnings below 1 or above
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100 per hour (in 1979 dollars) are therefore trimmed. We use the CPI-U-X1 series
as a deflator.
The CPS has a very complex sample design, whose main purpose is to attain
national and state representativeness and make sure that employment statistics
are accurate. As in most of the literature on earnings inequality, I multiply the
sampling weights by usual weekly hours so as to make the sample of hourly earnings
representative of the total hours worked in the economy.
After the 1994 CPS overhaul respondents with variable hours are allowed to
answer that their weekly “hours vary”. I use a method developed by Schmitt (2003)
to allocate weekly hours to these workers. Because the “hours vary” variables are
not kept in the NBER files, I extract them from a set of raw CPS data files and
merge them with the NBER dataset. Individuals answering their hours vary do
indicate whether they work full or part-time. We use regression predicted values
to impute usual hours for these individuals. Four separate regressions are used
according to gender and full-time status. The predictors are a quadratic function
of age, a set of race and education dummies, marital status, indicators for foreign
born and US citizens, and dummies for union, public sector, manufacturing, and
services. A small number of individuals who answer their hours vary provide hours
worked at the reported hourly wage (typically these workers work different jobs
at different rates and the interviewer records the hourly rate at the job with the
largest number of hours). In this case we give priority to the latter amount—a
true response—over the regression imputation.
Education The educational attainment variable is also of great importance in
this study. In 1992 the education item in the CPS questionnaire was modified. Pre-
viously individuals had been asked for the highest completed grade of schooling (in
years). The new item asks for the highest degree obtained. In 1998 a new battery
of questions was added that permit determining the highest grade completed in
most cases. I follow the imputation procedure developed by Jaeger (1997, 2003) to
obtain a consistent measure of the highest grade completed over the whole period.
Unfortunately the scarcity of information during the period 1992–97 results in
no individuals being imputed 15 or 17 years of education. This feature of the data
leads to improbable jumps in the mismatch prevalence series in 1992 and 1997.
To address this issue I first linked the 1997 and 1998 files. The extra information
available in 1998 could then be used to improve the imputation method for those
individuals present in both datasets and whose answers to the completed degree
questions where the same in both years. This adjustment is enough to almost
eliminate the jump in the series from 1997 to 1998. For the individuals in the
1997 sample whose education could not be determined in this way, and for the
42
respondents during the 1992–96 period I used a refinement of the Jaeger method
to impute completed years of schooling to those whose answer to the completed
degree question was problematic (i.e. the “some college,” “college,” and “advanced
degree” categories). First, for each of the problematic categories I estimated sepa-
rate ordered probits of completed years of schooling using the more complete 1998
survey. The predictors were sex, age, non-white, marital status, public sector,
manufacturing, services and a set of dummies for the 2-digit occupation. These
estimates were used to predict the probability of belonging to each of the com-
pleted years of schooling categories for the individuals in the imputation sample.
The imputation decision was done according to random assignment to each of the
completed years of schooling categories conditional on the predicted probabilities.
Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics
Males Females
1973 1983 1992 2002 1973 1983 1992 2002
lnW 1.91 1.79 1.77 1.88 1.51 1.47 1.55 1.69
0.49 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.53
E 11.90 12.85 13.23 13.50 12.01 12.88 13.42 13.79
3.14 2.94 2.94 3.02 2.65 2.50 2.59 2.73
Overeduc (V ) 15.6% 25.3% 31.1% 33.5% 15.5% 22.4% 30.5% 34.8%
Undereduc (U) 21.8% 12.2% 8.8% 8.9% 14.3% 8.6% 6.7% 7.7%
Qr 12.27 12.44 12.45 12.60 11.99 12.32 12.49 12.66
2.04 2.03 2.04 2.11 1.95 1.89 1.93 2.06
Qs 0.49 0.82 1.03 1.14 0.46 0.73 1.03 1.20
1.21 1.51 1.66 1.73 1.13 1.44 1.66 1.78
Qd 0.89 0.49 0.37 0.37 0.51 0.29 0.23 0.26
1.91 1.48 1.37 1.34 1.39 1.05 0.99 1.00
Age 36.93 36.17 36.77 38.51 36.73 35.64 36.96 38.98
12.73 12.02 11.14 11.47 13.32 12.11 11.19 11.71
Married 79.7% 70.5% 64.6% 63.0% 65.2% 59.3% 56.2% 54.6%
Non-white 14.6% 17.4% 22.6% 28.2% 17.0% 19.2% 22.6% 27.9%
Part-time 1.6% 3.5% 3.3% 2.3% 2.7% 5.8% 4.4% 2.7%
Public Sector 15.6% 16.0% 15.0% 13.4% 22.2% 20.5% 20.5% 20.2%
Manufacturing 34.5% 29.6% 26.1% 20.9% 23.4% 18.4% 15.0% 10.6%
Services 62.8% 67.5% 71.3% 76.7% 75.9% 80.9% 84.2% 88.6%
Sample Size 23,425 76,770 72,213 59,765 16,154 68,009 69,552 59,724
Notes: Standard deviations for continuous variables are in italics under the sample means.
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